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Social cognition researchers have become increasingly interested in the ways that
behavioral, physiological, and neural coupling facilitate social interaction and interpersonal
understanding. We distinguish two ways of conceptualizing the role of such coupling
processes in social cognition: strong and moderate interactionism. According to strong
interactionism (SI), low-level coupling processes are alternatives to higher-level individual
cognitive processes; the former at least sometimes render the latter superfluous.
Moderate interactionism (MI) on the other hand, is an integrative approach. Its guiding
assumption is that higher-level cognitive processes are likely to have been shaped by the
need to coordinate, modulate, and extract information from low-level coupling processes.
In this paper, we present a case study on Möbius Syndrome (MS) in order to contrast
SI and MI. We show how MS—a form of congenital bilateral facial paralysis—can be a
fruitful source of insight for research exploring the relation between high-level cognition
and low-level coupling. Lacking a capacity for facial expression, individuals with MS are
deprived of a primary channel for gestural coupling. According to SI, they lack an essential
enabling feature for social interaction and interpersonal understanding more generally and
thus ought to exhibit severe deficits in these areas. We challenge SI’s prediction and
show how MS cases offer compelling reasons for instead adopting MI’s pluralistic model
of social interaction and interpersonal understanding. We conclude that investigations
of coupling processes within social interaction should inform rather than marginalize or
eliminate investigation of higher-level individual cognition.
Keywords: Möbius Syndrome, social interaction, social cognition, theory of mind, emotion recognition, facial
paralysis, behavioral coupling
FROM MINDREADING TO COUPLING: STRONG AND
MODERATE FORMS OF INTERACTIONISM
Social cognition refers to the capacity to understand and inter-
act with others in contextually appropriate ways. Among other
things, it involves the ability to interpret mental states and
behavior: for example, to see actions and bodily expressions as
expressing particular emotions or intentions. For several decades,
the “Theory of Mind” paradigm was the dominant way of
understanding social cognition (Premack and Woodruff, 1978).
According to this paradigm, social cognition is a process ofmental
state attribution or “mindreading.” We understand or “read” oth-
ers’ behavior by attributing mental states to them; these mental
states are what allow us to interpret and predict current and future
behavior. Two competing proposals were offered to account for
the mechanisms enabling mindreading. According to Theory, we
use lay theories about how minds work to infer the existence
of mental states in others and interpret their expressions and
behavior (Perner, 1991; Gopnik and Wellman, 1992). Simulation
Theory, on the other hand, argues that we use our own emo-
tional, cognitive, and imaginative resources—either consciously
and deliberately or unconsciously and automatically—to model
others’ mental states. This simulation process is the basis of our
ability to understand their mental life (Gordon, 1986; Gallese,
2001; Goldman, 2006).
In recent years, an increasingly influential movement has
stressed the primacy of interaction in facilitating social under-
standing. This so-called “interactive turn” (de Jaegher et al., 2010)
urges us to reconsider the individualistic orientation of the min-
dreading paradigm. According to the interactionist, this paradigm
is individualistic in that it wrongly assumes that the mechanisms
enabling social cognition lie exclusively within the individual
brain. But this individualistic focus overlooks the way that social
cognition is fundamentally shaped by the broader temporal,
perceptual, and interactive dynamics of embodied engagement.
Interactionism thus “rejects the spectatorial supposition that we
are primarily spectators or observers of others’ behaviors. Our
normal everyday stance toward the other person is not third-
person, detached observation; it is second-person interaction”
(Gallagher, 2008, p. 164). Interactionism explanatorily prioritizes
structures and processes spanning multiple agents—including,
crucially, the coordinative patterns of verbal and non-verbal
behavior that determine the temporal character and qualita-
tive back-and-forth flow of an encounter. Interactionism thus
endorses a move away from thinking of social cognition as an
individualistic process of mental state attribution to one of par-
ticipatory engagement. The latter is characterized as a dynamic,
flexible, and reciprocal process jointly constructed in real-time by
multiple participants.
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Drawing upon dynamical systems theory, interactionists con-
ceptualize engagement and render it methodologically tractable
by appealing to the notion of “coupling,” which de Jaegher and
colleagues define as “the influence between a system’s variables
and another system’s parameters” (de Jaegher et al., 2010, p. 441;
cf. also Spivey, 2007; Thompson, 2007; Marsh et al., 2009). In
slightly less technical terms, two systems can be said to be cou-
pled “when the conduct of each is a function of the conduct of
the other” (Thompson, 2007, p. 45). For example, it has been
documented that two pendulums in adjacent rooms will tend
toward synchrony because they influence each other via minute
vibrations in walls and floors (Winfree, 2001; Bennett et al.,
2002). Or, to take a biological example, Buck and Buck (1976)
describe a species of firefly living in Southeast Asia, in which the
individual flashing behavior is synchronized at the group level
through the visual influence of the collective flashing pattern on
the individuals.
Nor is coupling just an exotic phenomenon occurring only in
pendulums and certain non-human organisms: think of the well-
known phenomenon that arises when you are walking along a
narrow path and somebody comes from the other direction and
each tries to avoid the other. Each person’s movement (shifting to
the right or to the left) constrains the other person’s movement,
which sometimes causes the two individuals to become coupled
to each other in an interaction that is not planned or controlled
at the level of individual cognition. Thus, according to de Jaegher
and Di Paolo (2007, p. 493), the best way to explain and predict
the course of this interaction is by modeling the interaction as
such, not the individuals’ intentions.
To see how the role of coupling within social interactions
can be investigated experimentally, consider the famous study by
Murray and Trevarthen (1985) in which a baby and a mother
interact via video. In the test condition, the live video of the
mother that the baby sees is replaced by a video of the mother
from an earlier sequence in the interaction; this upsets the baby
just as much as if the mother’s face suddenly goes blank (i.e.,
the “still face” condition (Tronick et al., 1978) and she no longer
expresses anything. In this case, we might characterize the struc-
ture of the social interaction as the coupling of two systems:
the baby is interested not just in the mother’s expressiveness but
in being coupled to her, that is, in mutually engaging with and
influencing her reactions, which in turn shape the infant’s own
responses. In some other cases, it can also be fruitful to inves-
tigate the coupling of subcomponents of a larger interaction: for
example, the coupling of behavioral (e.g., gestures), physiologi-
cal (e.g., heart rate) or neural (e.g., electrical activity) processes
that unfold naturally in social engagements (de Rugy et al., 2006;
Richardson et al., 2007; Knoblich and Sebanz, 2008; Oullier et al.,
2008; Schmidt and Richardson, 2008).
In the following, we will contrast two ways of conceptualizing
the role of coupling processes in social cognition. According to
what we shall call strong interactionism (SI), coupling processes
are explanatory alternatives to the lay theories and simulations
postulated by mindreading approaches. SI claims that online
interaction carries the weight of social understanding. It is var-
iously (depending on the specific account in question) conceived
of as necessary, sufficient, or both necessary and sufficient for
social cognition.1 SI is thus a sectarian perspective. It regards the
shared dynamics of interaction as alternatives to individual cog-
nition. Moderate interactionism (MI), on the other hand, aims to
offer explanations that integrate individual processes with shared
coupling processes. It is apparent that both types of approach
ascribe a key coordinating role to coupling processes in sustain-
ing social interaction and understanding. However—and this is
the crucial point—SI and MI are nevertheless, respectively com-
mitted to different conceptions of the relationship between (1)
shared coupling processes and (2) individual cognitive capacities
(e.g., working memory, attention, control, consciousness) and
processes (e.g., mindreading, monitoring, prediction, reasoning).
Our primary aim in contrasting these two positions is to artic-
ulate distinct conceptual alternatives (and to give reasons for
favoring one of them)—and not, then, to argue that any particular
theorist is best interpreted as endorsing either of the alternatives.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of illustrating these two positions,
we will cite some theorists who appear, at least in the passages
we refer to, to be attracted to one or the other. It is important to
emphasize, however, that we do not intend to preclude the possi-
bility that some or most of the theorists cited in connection with
SI would ultimately agree with us that MI is a more balanced and
fruitful alternative. Indeed, if so, so much the better.
Shaun Gallagher, for example, has at times appeared to exem-
plify SI. Gallagher (2001, 2008) has offered a developmental
argument to the effect that the embodied responses making
up so-called “primary intersubjectivity” (cf. Trevarthen, 1979)—
responses present early in childhood and which remain centrally
important even in adults—are independent of an ability to men-
talize. Such embodied responses as affect attunement (Stern,
1985), neonate imitation (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977), and gaze
following (Senju et al., 2006), which are elicited within social
interactions, help to couple agents to each other and thereby to
sustain interaction and mutual understanding. Since children do
not tend to pass explicit false belief tests until they are 4–5 years
old,2 as Gallagher notes, there is a prima facie case to be made that
many of these embodied social responses are developmentally
prior to and thus independent of an ability to mentalize.
More recently, some researchers working in the enactivist tra-
dition (e.g., Auvray et al., 2009; Fuchs and de Jaegher, 2009; de
Jaegher et al., 2010; Froese and Di Paolo, 2010), have offered
what we consider to be strong interactionist interpretations of
the role of coupling in social interactions such as the aforemen-
tioned double-video experiment. Auvray and colleagues (2009),
for example, raise the question whether the role of coupling in
sustaining this sort of interaction must be accounted for in indi-
vidualistic terms. They ask if it is necessary or appropriate to
ascribe to each individual agent an ability to detect an intentional
1There are a number of more fine-grained distinctions we might consider
in interpreting this claim; these distinctions need not concern us here.
For extended discussions, see Overgaard and Michael (Under review) and
Michael, 2011.
2Evidence for implicit false belief understanding in children as young as 11
months obviously puts pressure on this argument, but that is beyond the
scope of this paper (see Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Baillargeon et al., 2010;
Michael, 2011; for overviews of this research).
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subject who is perceptually directing her movements in a way
that is contingent upon the agent’s own perceptually directed
movements. Alternatively, Auvray and colleagues propose the
possibility that “some of the mechanisms underlying the recogni-
tion of others are intrinsic to the shared perceptual activity itself
(i.e., intrinsic to the interdependence between the two percep-
tual activities)” (Auvray et al., 2009, p. 34). As de Jaegher and Di
Paolo (2007) put it: “If pendulum clocks can do it without mech-
anisms for ‘timing the beat’ and ‘forming a temporal estimate,’
why can’t babies? In our perspective, what infant and mother do
in this example is possible through the interaction alone” (499).
Similarly, in discussing the importance of sensory contingencies
in coordinating interactions, Di Paolo et al. (2008) deny that indi-
viduals must recognize their mutual coupling in order for it to
play a coordinated role. Rather, “interaction can dynamically cre-
ate phenomena that do not directly result from the individual
capacities or behaviors of any of the partners if investigated on
their own” (279).
In a sort of theoretical culmination of this work on the role of
coupling in social interactions like the one devised for the double-
video experiment,3 de Jaegher et al. (2010) argue that there are a
range of cases in which the constitutive role played by emergent
systems, (i.e., by coupled interactions) in social cognition“replaces
individual mechanisms” such as mindreading (de Jaegher et al.,
2010, p. 441). They urge that “if we take seriously the idea that
interaction can enable and constitute social cognition, we can
conceive of interaction dynamics as, in some cases, delivering the
necessary cognitive performance. There is no need to duplicate
their effectsbyan individualmechanism” (de Jaegher et al., 2010, p.
445).4Call this the “reduplication thesis”: the idea that, if coupling
processes and other features of interactions are shown to be suffi-
cient for facilitating social understanding, we need not reduplicate
their functions by appealing to individualistic mechanisms.
MI, in contrast, is an integrative approach. Its guiding assump-
tion is that higher-level cognitive processes are likely to have been
shaped by the need to coordinate, modulate, and extract informa-
tion from low-level coupling processes. Investigation of coupling
processes should inform rather than marginalize or eliminate
the investigation of individual cognitive processes. To see how
this general conception contrasts with SI, consider an alternative,
more moderate way of understanding the double-video exper-
iment. Rather than saying that the features of the interaction
itself explain the baby’s reaction, one might say that the baby
processes not only a stimulus but also features of the interaction.
Gergely and Watson (1996), for example, attribute the infants’
differential responses to cognitive mechanisms in the infant such
as an innate contingency detector. Similarly, describing mother-
infant interactions in which the mother amuses the infant by
continually repeating an utterance and each time stretching both
its duration as well as the intervals between utterances, Daniel
Stern writes: “there could be no such effect . . . unless the infant
had some mechanism for timing the beat and forming a tem-
poral estimate of when the next beat should fall” (2002/1977,
3As well as more recent developments, in particular Auvray et al., 2009
perceptual crossing experiment.
4For similar statements, see de Jaegher and Froese, 2009, and Di Paolo, 2009.
p. 114). The interpretations offered by these theorists are more
moderate insofar as they envision a crucial role for individual
cognitive processes in detecting and sustaining coupling. Indeed,
they suggest the strategy of treating the interactive experiment as
a means to elicit coupling in order to test hypotheses about indi-
vidual cognitive processes that detect and/or sustain it.5 Although
this strategy may be superfluous in some simple cases in which
the behavior of coupled systems can be adequately explained
at the level of the interaction as such (e.g., the synchronization
of pendulums), we submit that it is a more promising option
in complex cases involving more sophisticated systems such as
living organisms. Even the synchronization of flashing in fireflies
involves processes (simple heuristics, algorithms, etc.) within the
individual fireflies; the systems-level analysis does not replace but
rather complements the otherwise incomplete picture that we get
by looking at processes in individual fireflies. And once we turn
our attention to such sophisticated creatures as human beings,
it is all the more compelling to suppose that various kinds of
individual cognitive processes are integrated in diverse and subtle
wayswith coupling processes that spanmultiple individuals. Thus,
in the aforementioned example of two people trying to pass by
each other on a narrow path, individual intentions and action
plans (e.g., to avoid coupling, to shift to the left, etc.) are after all
playing a role in generating the coupling, even though they are
not having the effect that the individuals desire or expect them
to have. From a moderate perspective, then, individual cognitive
processes are part of the picture of what is going on in these
cases. In short, MI adopts an ecumenical perspective; it sees social
cognition as a diverse collection of processes and strategies for
navigating the interpersonal world.
Again, both SI and MI attribute a central role to coupling
processes and other features of online interactions. But they dis-
agree about the relationship between these interactive elements
and individual cognitive capacities and processes. They also differ
in the predictions they generate about cases in which coupling
processes are missing or somehow compromised. In what fol-
lows, we use Möbius Syndrome (MS) as a litmus test to contrast
and evaluate these predictions. Since they lack facial expressions,
people with MS are deprived not only of an important means
of expressing their emotions6 but also of a primary channel for
behavioral coupling—and thus of an essential enabling feature
of social interaction. And if coupling processes are necessary for
social understanding, as some SI proponents appear to suggest, it
would seem that social understanding in people withMS ought to
5For other statements of what we would call MI, see for example, Michael
(2011), who calls his position “modest interactionism”; Sutton et al. (2011),
who espouse a similar conception of the relationship between embodiment
and higher-level cognition; Herschbach, 2011, who defends an integrative,
multi-level conception based on mechanistic ideas.
6As we will see, one of the intriguing suggestions we might draw from MS
cases is a strongly embodied conception of emotion: that is, the idea that the
experiential character of at least some emotions is deeply dependent upon var-
ious forms of bodily expression (facial expressions, gestures, and whole-body
expressions). So, rather than consisting of relatively brief physiological states
(Izard, 1974; Panskepp, 1992; LeDoux, 1996), aspects of certain emotions may
instead be distributed across the expressive dynamics of the visible, tangible
body—as well as the social interactions the body enters into (see Krueger,
forthcoming; see also Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009).
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be likewise significantly affected. Similarly, if coupling processes
are sufficient for social understanding, there is no reason to expect
that de-coupled individual strategies would emerge to “redupli-
cate” what coupling processes already achieve. SI thus predicts
that individuals with MS should exhibit deficits in certain aspects
of social interaction and understanding.
There is some support for these predictions, which we discuss
below.However, we argue that the deficits are neither as severe nor
as comprehensive as SI predicts. Moreover, SI cannot account for
differences within the population of individuals with MS. There
is evidence that individuals with MS adopt a range of strategies
to compensate for their lack of facial expression. Some of these
strategies not only compensate for the absence of information
otherwise provided via facial expressions but also enable alter-
native forms of coupling: coupling of hand gestures and other
bodily movements, conversational and emotional alignment, etc.
As we will see, however, these compensatory strategies emerge via
explicitly high-level cognitive (i.e., individualistic, reflective) pro-
cesses. But this stands in contrast to SI’s predictions. In contrast to
SI, MI does predict that individuals with MS will avail themselves
of such high-level cognitive strategies, and that this may also lead
to alternative forms of coupling. We turn to this discussion now.
THE INVISIBLE SMILE7: PSYCHOSOCIAL EFFECTS OF MS
MS is a rare form of congenital facial paralysis—normally com-
plete and bilateral—resulting from maldevelopment of the sixth
and seventh cranial nerves (Briegel, 2006). People with MS are
unable to form any sort of facial expression;8 they also lack ocular
abduction and thus tend to move their entire head when track-
ing objects in their environment. Accordingly, they lack access to
basic physical resources that most of us take for granted when
expressing emotion, including an ability to provide face-related
social cues to others.9
Studies of individuals with facial movement disorders have
found various kinds of psychological distress, which impairs
the quality of their social and physical functioning (Bogart and
Matsumoto, 2010b). For example, people with various facial neu-
romuscular disorders exhibit considerably higher levels of anxiety
than the general population (van Swearingen et al., 1998, 1999).10
Another study found similar results in individuals with various
other visible disfigurements including burns, head and hand con-
ditions, vascular anomalies, skin conditions, and rheumatic dis-
eases (Rumsey et al., 2004). In one of the few studies specifically
on MS, individuals were found to exhibit traits of inhibition,
7The phrase “the invisible smile” is borrowed from the title of a book by Cole
and Spalding (2009).
8The absence of movement leads facial muscles to atrophy, which can give the
face a smooth look with a slack, half-open mouth (Cole and Spalding, 2009,
p. 3).
9Others parts of the condition include small tongue (which leads to difficul-
ties feeding and speaking), breathing difficulties,malformation of arms or legs
(e.g., missing fingers, underdeveloped calf muscles and extremely high arched
feet), associated movement difficulties (e.g., clumsiness, late development sit-
ting and standing, difficulties in running, jumping, and hopping, etc.) (see
Cole and Spalding, 2009, pp. 2–5).
10But see Bogart and Matsumoto (2010b) for some compelling reasons to be
cautious when generalizing results from these studies to individuals with MS.
introversion, and heightened feelings of social inadequacy and
inferiority (Briegel, 2007).
These results are not surprising given the centrality of facial
expression in facilitating social interaction. Our face is the locus
of our social identity. Whenwe perceive others, there is something
experientially unique about our encounter with the face (Levinas,
1969). One reason for this is the fact that the face is a rich multi-
modal source of socially salient information. Consider the role
of basic facial expressions. Although we begin practicing facial
expressions in the solitude of the womb (Reissland et al., 2011),
smiles, for example, occur mainly in social contexts (Kraut and
Johnston, 1979; Jones et al., 1991). Smiles don’t merely express
positive affect. They also have a social function. Smiles relay inten-
tions to further ongoing interactions, elicit positive reciprocal
responses, convey appraisals, and promote cooperation and social
cohesion (van Swearingen et al., 1999).
We respond to smiles and other facial expressions because our
face recognition abilities are well-developed from birth. Infants
are born with a predisposition toward face-related stimuli: they
are able to discriminate faces from other stimuli (Mondloch et al.,
1999), preferentially track moving face stimuli (Johnson et al.,
1991), and within days of birth discriminate between the faces
of different people (Walton et al., 1992; Bushnell, 2001). Infants
quickly show a preference for their mother’s face and attractive
faces, andminutes after birth can imitate facial expressions such as
tongueprotrusionandmouthopening (Meltzoff andMoore, 1997;
Slater and Quinn, 2001).11 In adulthood the face retains a special
experiential status. Facial appearance (including expressiveness or
lack thereof) is often seen as an expression of a person’s character
(Berry andMcArthur, 1986). And it is telling that individuals with
socialphobias tendtoavoid lookingat faces(Chenetal., 2002).Face
perception is thus special, phenomenologically and functionally.12
From the moment we enter the world until the moment we leave
it, the face is the center of gravity for our social interactions. 13
11These findings have not gone uncontested. See Anisfeld, 2005 and Jones,
2009.
12It even appears to be sub-served by discretemechanisms and brain regions—
such as the fusiform face area (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Spiridon and Kanwisher,
2002)—selectively involved in perceiving and exploring face-based social
information (Nelson, 2001; Adolphs, 2006).
13This is not to deny the importance of social information provided by
other channels (voice/prosody, gesture, language, spatial proximity, etc.) in
facilitating social understanding. We encounter others as embodied subjects;
they are given via perceptual gestalts comprised of multiple channels of
information (see the discussion of “coupled strategies” below). Nor is this
intended to deny the importance of others’ reactions in shaping the character
and development of our social competence. Indeed, an important lesson from
MS, we suggest, is that part of their (i.e., people with MS) social struggles
arise due to others’ inability to competently deal with facial difference. For
example, some young children with MS are assumed to be retarded because
of difficulty in feeding, drooling, and dysarthric speech. This assumption
clearly alters how they are treated and has consequences for their social-
cognitive development. For those whose faces do not conform to the norm,
the social exclusion and isolation experienced becomes a source of stress,
anxiety, and anguish, which negatively effects psychosocial development as
well as personality functioning and mental health (Cooke Macgregor, 1990).
We are thus always in relation to others whose responses play a critical role
in shaping our own moment-to-moment responses as well as the ontogenesis
of our social-cognitive competence.
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Not surprisingly, the narratives of individuals with MS betray
an acute awareness of feeling out of sync with and misunderstood
by others (Cole and Spalding, 2009). Indeed, many people are ill-
equipped to engage with facial difference, finding it off-putting or
frightening. One reason is that facial expressions provide infor-
mation about the mental states of the individual producing them.
Without this expected information, however, an interactant may
feel uncomfortable or confused about what the other person is
thinking or feeling.14
Both SI and MI suggest that there may be an additional rea-
son for the social difficulties people with MS encounter, one
which centers on behavioral coupling. Facial expressions don’t
only provide information about another’s mental states. 15 They
also enable at least two kinds of behavioral coupling—movement
synchrony andmotormimicry (in particular facial mimicry)—that
play a central role in driving social interaction and understanding.
Could it be that the absence of these two kinds of coupling is an
additional source of social difficulties for individuals withMS?We
consider this idea now.
GESTURAL COUPLING: SYNCHRONY ANDMIMICRY
When we engage with others, there is, in addition to the content
of our spoken utterances, another concurrent layer of implicit
bodily communication at work. Social interaction rests on vari-
ous forms of non-verbal communication including postural and
behavioral coordination (Scheflen, 1964; Bernieri and Rosenthal,
1991). Non-verbal information is crucial for successful under-
standing (Mehrabian, 1971). Considerations of non-verbal com-
munication have a long history.16 However, we have only recently
recognized how much of it consists of our involuntarily synchro-
nizing with and mimicking the movements, gestures, facial and
bodily expressions of others. This level of social interaction is
realized in different forms of behavioral coupling.
Consider movement synchrony. Movement synchrony occurs
when a precise synchronization between the speech rhythms and
bodily movements of two partners unfolds spontaneously within
an interaction (Bernieri, 1988). This synchrony can develop at
different time scales: from the milliseconds-long coordination of
speech and hand gestures (Condon, 1982) to cycles of hour-long
conversations (Hayes and Cobb, 1982). It can also emerge in non-
verbal contexts like walking (Zivotofsky and Hausdorff, 2007; van
Ulzen et al., 2008) and when using rocking chairs (Richardson
et al., 2007). Synchronous movement is a form of implicit bodily
communication. One of its psychosocial functions is to promote
social cohesion, enhancing feelings of connectedness, rapport,
and cooperation among interactants (Bernieri, 1988; Hove and
Risen, 2009; Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009; Valdesolo et al., 2010).
There is further evidence that movement synchrony not only
motivates partners to interact but also enhances their ability to
14Note that this explanation does not necessarily appeal to real, online social
interaction; it may also apply to cases where a detached onlooker is observing
an individual with MS from afar or on TV.
15Some facial expressions—as well as other bodily expressions and gestures—
may even be part of the ontology of certain emotions states. See Krueger
(forthcoming).
16See Darwin, 1872/1965, Lipps, 1907, and Smith, 1759/1966.
do so (Valdesolo et al., 2010). One reason may be that syn-
chrony increases interactants’ attention to one another’s move-
ments. Additionally, it may be easier to predict and adapt to the
movements of another moving at a similar tempo and initiating
movements of a similar size, duration, and force as oneself.
Another form of implicit bodily communication is motor
mimicry. Interactants mimic the behavioral patterns of others
by adopting similar postures, mannerisms and bodily configu-
rations (Hatfield et al., 1994). This link between perception and
behavior—I perceive another’s posture or behavior, causingme to
assume that posture or behavior, which in turn is perceived by the
other and heightens their feeling of rapport—is a kind of “social
glue” (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999) facilitating the convergence of
emotional states between interactants, thereby heightening feel-
ings of mutual understanding (Hatfield et al., 1994; Lakin and
Chartrand, 2003) and increasing pro-social behavior (e.g., pick-
ing up another’s dropped pen or giving to charity) (van Baaren
et al., 2004).
While posture, gestures, and movement are all part of our
mimetic repertoire, their mimetic capabilities are somewhat lim-
ited in comparison with those of the face. In light of its com-
plex neuromusculature, the face is capable of realizing a highly
fine-grained form of mimicry. 17 Facial mimicry consists of the
generally involuntary activity of facial muscles that occurs in
response to seeing the same facial expressions in others. Human
perceivers at all age stages spontaneously imitate facial expressions
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1977, 1989; Dimberg, 1997; Doherty, 1998;
Lang et al., 1993; Öhman, 2002). Even viewing static pictures of
facial expressions produces rapid, covert activation of one’s own
facial musculature mimicking the viewed faces (Lundqvist and
Dimberg, 1995; Dimberg and Thunberg, 1998).
As already noted, mimicry tends to induce an affiliative moti-
vation to socially engage by enhancing feelings of connectedness,
rapport, and cooperation. However, mimicry is likely to have
an even greater influence than synchrony upon our experience
of others. There is some evidence that facial mimicry influences
judgments that we make about others’ personalities (Blairy et al.,
1999). Moreover, some researchers have speculated that facial
mimicry may also contribute to social understanding by playing
a central role in mindreading: namely, in the attribution of men-
tal states to others based on their facial expressions (Lipps, 1907;
Niedenthal et al., 2001; Goldman and Sripada, 2005). The sug-
gestion is that in order to perceive and understand what type of
emotion an individual is experiencing, it may first be necessary to
facially mimic that state. According to one model—the reverse
simulation model (Lipps, 1907; Blakemore and Decety, 2001;
Goldman and Sripada, 2005)—face-based emotion recognition is
17Head and body cues (facial expressions versus posture, hand gestures, pat-
terns of movement, etc.) convey different socio-affective information (Ekman,
1965). While bodily cues convey information about the intensity or level
of arousal of an emotional experience but little about the specific kind of
emotion (but see de Gelder, 2009), facial expressions, in contrast, convey
information about the specific kind of emotion being experienced but less
about its intensity. Perception of both facial and bodily cues is thus cru-
cial for social interaction, given that each provides different information.
Nevertheless, it is the face which provides more fine-grained, emotion-specific
information.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 81 | 5
Krueger and Michael Gestural coupling and social cognition
a three-step process. First, an observer sees a facial expression of
emotion in another person and automatically mimics this expres-
sion. Second, proprioceptive facial feedback produces traces of
the emotion being mimicked in the observer. Third, the observer
classifies her own attenuated emotional experience and proceeds
to attribute this emotion to the observed face. This simulation
heuristic need not be something the observer deliberately initi-
ates or is even aware of; rather, it is rapid, covert, and automatic,
occurring at a sub-threshold level.
There are multiple lines of evidence that appear to support this
thesis and affirm the facilitative role of facial mimicry in min-
dreading.18 Step one is supported by the previously-cited evidence
concerning our tendency to covertly mimic the facial expressions
of those we observe. Steps two and three receive independent
support from other strands of research.
For example, a number of studies have found that deficits in
the production of a particular emotional experience and deficits
in the face-based recognition of that same emotion in others reli-
ably co-occur (Goldman and Sripada, 2005). Adolphs et al. (1994)
found that an individual who suffered from bilateral destruction
of her amygdalae—widely recognized to play a central role in
mediating fear—showed severe impairment in face-based recog-
nition of fear. Importantly, this individual also showed a severe
impairment in her experience of fear (Damasio, 1999, p. 66),
along with an abnormality in acquiring or facially expressing con-
ditioned emotion responses (e.g., expressions of fear) (Bechara
et al., 1995). Similar effects have been found with disgust and
anger.19Numerous other studies have found that individuals with
disorders of emotional experience—for example, schizophrenia
or major depressive disorder, both of which involve flattened
affect, anhedonia, and, crucially, diminished facial expressivity—
process emotional information abnormally (see Atkinson, 2007,
pp. 363–366 for a review). In these cases, a deficit in our ability
to facially express a specific emotion—and thus experience traces
of that emotion (see below)—may impede our ability to see that
same emotion in others.20
18As we shall see later on, research on MS also provides grounds to be wary of
the reverse simulation model.
19An individual suffering from damage to his anterior insula and basal
ganglia—and whose overall score for disgust on a questionnaire was signif-
icantly lower than that of controls (even though his anger and fear scores
did not differ from control’s mean scores)—showed selective and significant
impairment in face-based disgust recognition (Calder et al., 2000b; see also
Adolphs et al., 2003). Another study found that the administration of sulpride,
an antipsychotic drug that reduces aggression by blocking dopamine recep-
tors, impaired otherwise healthy participant’s recognition of facial displays of
anger but no other emotions (Lawrence et al., 2002).
20It may be objected that, in these latter cases, it’s not, as this gloss suggests, the
lack of peripheral facial responses that’s the real problem—peripheral facial
nerves are in fact normal in these patients—but rather a central deficit in fear
representation (or disgust or anger, for example). So, they don’t shed much
light on the role of facial mimicry in facilitating emotion comprehension;
rather, they indicate the centrality of representation. However, this objection
presupposes a linear causal pathway running from representations to facial
exertions; the former is antecedent to the latter. But it may be, rather, that
since these individuals are unable to produce any traces of the emotion within
their own system, the requisite facial exertions “fail to arouse the appropriate
neural activity for emotion production” (Goldman and Sripada, 2005, p. 204).
In other words, the causal pathway may be bi-directional. A sizeable body of
Another line of support comes by way of the facial feedback
hypothesis, according to which proprioceptive feedback from
facial expressions is either necessary or sufficient for emotional
experience (Izard, 1971; Laird, 2007). Simplymimicking the facial
displays of happiness—smiling broadly, raising one’s eyebrows—
may be enough to induce the experience of that state (Adelmann
and Zajonc, 1989; Soussignan, 2002) and its associated facial
EMG and patterns of autonomic arousal (Hess et al., 1992).
Conversely, many studies indicate that the inhibition of bodily
expression—particularly facial expression—diminishes the phe-
nomenal intensity of experienced emotion (Darwin, 1872; see
also Laird, 2007 and Niedenthal, 2007) and, more pertinent for
our concerns, interferes with processing of emotional informa-
tion, including our response to others’ face-based emotional cues
(Niedenthal et al., 2005; Niedenthal, 2007). For example, individ-
uals who have voluntarily undergone Botox injections report both
a decrease in the experiential intensity of certain emotions (Davis
et al., 2010) as well as increased difficulty in processing emotional
language that refers to facial expressions requiring the paralyzed
facial muscles (Havas et al., 2010).
A final line of supporting evidence concerns findings related
to the so-called mirror system. Within the mirror system, inter-
nal action representations are activated both in the production
and the observation of an action (reaching for a cup, swinging a
baseball bat, etc.). When one observes a specific action-type, neu-
rons in the premotor cortex and posterior parietal cortex fire as if
one were performing that same action-type oneself (Gallese et al.,
1996; Rizolatti et al., 1996; Iacoboni et al., 2001). More pointedly,
there is evidence that the mirror system may be operative dur-
ing the observation of facial expressions. For example, an fMRI
study by Carr et al. (2003) found that a similar network of brain
areas (including the premotor cortex) were active both when a
subject imitated and passively observed an emotion-expressive
face. Other studies have found similar results (Leslie et al., 2004;
Dapretto et al., 2005). Together, they suggest that the activation of
mirror neurons when observing face-based emotion expressions
may code equivalence between self and other, which allows for an
empathic understanding of another’s emotional cues.Mirror neu-
ron activity may thus be another layer of simulation sub-serving
facial mimicry.
In summary, both movement synchrony and mimicry are two
basic forms of behavioral coupling that generate rapport and
motivate us to interact with others. Beyond this, mimicry—
especially facial mimicry—may introduce a critical mindreading
dimension that is crucial in facilitating rudimentary social under-
standing (e.g., emotion detection). In various ways, these studies
further affirm that the animate face, expressively coupled to
other animate faces, is the lynchpin of social understanding.
It, therefore, seems reasonable to expect that individuals with
MS, deprived of this lynchpin, would face various difficulties in
evidence—some of which is mentioned in the following paragraph—indicates
that facialmovements precede emotion experience (see Goldman and Sripada,
2005, pp. 205–206; Atkinson, 2007 pp. 369–374); other studies posit a link
between somatosensory impairment and face-based emotion recognition (see,
for example, Adolphs et al., 2000). We are grateful to one of the reviewers for
pressing us here.
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understanding others; certainly SI predicts this outcome. Let us
now take a closer look at the social difficulties that have been
reported in people with MS.
THE EFFECTS OF IMPAIRED SYNCHRONIZATION AND
MIMICRY UPON SOCIAL EXPERIENCE IN MS
Given the role of synchronization and facial mimicry in sustaining
rapport, it is no surprise that individuals with MS tend to exhibit
more traits of inhibition, introversion, and feelings of social inad-
equacy and inferiority than a matched control group (Briegel,
2007). Moreover, the disruption of movement synchrony in the
faces of interacting partners could also impede the development
of movement synchrony in other parts of the body—if, for exam-
ple, the non-MS interactant is put off by or misinterprets the lack
of facial synchrony. If synchrony facilitates the coordination of
movements within joint actions by increasing partners’ attention
to one another’s movements and by making both partners more
predictable to each other, then a disruption in synchrony could
lead to difficulties in coordination within joint actions for groups
in which one or more members has MS. This could be one reason
for the general difficulties with social interactions that individuals
with MS often report (Bogart and Matsumoto, 2010b). In addi-
tion, the evidence that facial mimicry influences our perception
of others’ personalities (Blairy et al., 1999) might partially explain
why individuals with facial impoverishment are often perceived as
unfriendly, depressed, disinterested, or unintelligent (Lyons et al.,
2004; Tickle-Degnen and Lyons, 2004), making others less likely
to pursue friendships with them (Hemmesch et al., 2009).
It must be emphasized, however, that this is not true of all
individuals with MS. We will look more carefully at individual
differences in compensatory strategies momentarily. First, how-
ever, we would like to consider a different issue separate from the
question of how non-MS interactants shape the dyadic encounter.
This issue has to do with MS side of the dyad: namely, face-based
emotion recognition in people with MS. Many of the studies can-
vassed in section “Gestural coupling: synchrony and mimicry,”
along with the reverse simulation model of emotion recognition,
suggest that individuals with deficits in producing, experienc-
ing or expressing an emotion may also suffer from a deficit
in the face-based recognition of that same emotion when they
see it in others (e.g., Adolphs et al., 1994, 2000, 2003; Calder
et al., 2000a; Goldman and Sripada, 2005). To reiterate, the idea
is that face-based emotion recognition requires one to facially
mimic the observed state; this mimicry may then generate an
attenuated emotion experience within oneself that is used to clas-
sify the observed emotion in another. Given their complete lack
of facial expressivity—as well as reports that MS can lead to
a reduction in emotional experience—people with MS appear
to be physiologically precluded from engaging in either part of
this process (i.e., the mimicry or the production/experience of
the emotion). They are, therefore, an ideal group to test this
hypothesis.
Clearly people with MS cannot facially express emotion. Based
upon reports from some with MS, it also appears that this inabil-
ity to facially express emotions correlates with a deficit in produc-
ing and experiencing certain emotions (Cole, 2010). For example,
James, a priest in his fifties with MS, writes, “I sort of think
happy or think sad, not really saying, or recognizing, actually
feeling happy or sad . . . I’ve often thought of myself as a specta-
tor rather than a participant” (Cole, 1999, p. 308). Other reports
express a similar sentiment. Since people with MS cannot pro-
duce facial expressions—and since basic emotions appear to have
innate, cross-cultural facial signatures (Ekman, 1993; Matsumoto
and Willingham, 2009)—it is not surprising that they report a
deficit in emotional experience, if the embodied expression of an
emotion (along with its social sharing) is indeed necessary for its
being experienced (Niedenthal, 2007; Cole, 2010, p. 667; see also
Krueger, 2011, forthcoming).21
These reports are all the more reason to expect that people
with MS also have a deficit in mindreading (i.e., processing facial
expressions of emotion). Again, the reverse simulation model—
which, in emphasizing the centrality of facial coupling, can be
thought of as endorsing SI—certainly predicts this outcome.
But things are not that simple. There have been few studies of
face-based emotion recognition in people with facial paralysis
(Giannini et al., 1984; Calder et al., 2000a; Keillor et al., 2002).
While these studies offer some evidence that people with MS
exhibit a deficit in emotion recognition, they suffer from small
sample sizes; moreover, they offer conflicting results. Giannini
et al. (1984), for example, report that a woman of normal intel-
ligence with MS was completely unable to perform a facial
recognition task. However, Calder et al. (2000)—based upon a
study of three participants with MS and a control group of 40
normal participants—found that one participant with MS was
unimpaired in an expression recognition task, one showed mild
deficits, and one was significantly impaired. A woman with tem-
porary bilateral facial paralysis (due to Guillain-Barre syndrome)
in Keillor et al. (2002) showed no impairment.
Conducting a study on the internet, Bogart and Matsumoto
(2010a) were able to achieve a sample size of 37 people with MS,
paired with 37 age and gender matched controls. Participants
viewed a total of 42 photos from Matsumoto and Ekman’s
(2006) Multi-Ethnic Facial Expression set. They indicated which
emotion was being expressed by selecting from a list of
response choices including the seven universally-produced emo-
tions (Ekman and Friesen, 1975; Matsumoto and Willingham,
2009), “neutral,” and “other.” Participants also completed a Facial
Expression Communication Questionnaire (FECQ) to assess
their self-reported ability to facially communicate the seven uni-
versal emotions. The result was that people with MS, despite
an inability to enact facial coupling (i.e., mimicry) and expe-
rience proprioceptive facial feedback (and perhaps attenuated
emotional experience), did not differ from the matched control
group or normative data in their ability to accurately recognize
facial expressions (Bogart and Matsumoto, 2010b, p. 247).
What are we to make of these findings? One immediate con-
sequence is that they appear to challenge the predictions of the
21To be clear, many emotions may require a more robustly embodied expres-
sion (i.e., not simply a facial expression) to be experienced. And since people
with MS often report feeling distanced from their body as a whole, particu-
larly in childhood development, their expressive deficit may encompass not
just their face but rather the whole overt bodily expressive form of particular
emotions (see Cole and Spalding, 2009, pp. 41–56, 196–202).
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reverse simulationmodel and the facial feedback hypothesis. They
also appear to challenge SI more generally (more on that in a
moment). While much evidence suggests that people sponta-
neously mimic the facial expressions they observe in others, it
is not clear that mimicry is required to see these emotions as
such (Gump and Kulik, 1997; Blairy et al., 1999). Rather, the
provisional conclusion to draw is that facial mimicry (in those
capable of it) provides additional motor information regarding
the expression to decode—and thus creates a certain facilitative
effect within the face-to-face dynamics of real-time interaction—
but that mimicry is not necessary for emotion recognition. At least
a certain form of social understanding (perceptually decoding
emotions) can proceed independently of mimicry.
In response, the proponent of the reverse simulation model
might argue that the mirror system (located in the frontal and
parietal lobes) remains intact in people with MS; their neural dis-
turbance is relatively peripheral, involving the sixth and seventh
cranial nerves. So, the mirror system might be operative—and
a neural form of mimicry present—even if there is no facial
mimicry to reflect it. The necessary feedback may thus derive
from activation of motor plans in premotor and/or parietal areas
rather than from the facial musculature. 22 This is possible, and
would indeed be worth investigating in an imaging study. One
reason to be skeptical, however, is that peripheral neural distur-
bances have higher-level effects at the cortical level. For example,
there are reports that early peripheral blindness leads to changes
in the visually deprived cortex (Neville and Bavelier, 2000, pp.
89–90). Other research indicates that cortical reorganization in
individuals following finger amputation can occur as quickly as
ten days after their operation (Weiss et al., 2000). On the other
hand, Gazzola et al. (2007) reported finding that two aplasics sub-
jects (born without arms or hands) hadmore or less normal levels
of activation in the putative mirror system while observing hand
actions. This may suggest that neural circuits underlying action
representations in premotor cortex are unaffected by the periph-
eral differences in these subjects’ bodies. Interestingly, however,
when observing some hand actions, the aplasic subjects showed
increased activation in areas that were also recruited when they
themselves used one of their feet to perform an equivalent action,
thus suggesting that their development of a compensatory action
repertoire had an influence upon the neural processes underlying
action recognition.23 In sum, it must be regarded as an open ques-
tion whether peripheral neural deficits in people with MS have or
have not resulted in higher-level deficits.
Another response open to the proponent of the reverse sim-
ulation model is to suggest that people with MS develop various
compensatory strategies to replace their lack of facial expressive-
ness; we ought to therefore look to these cases with caution and
hesitate to generalize their results (Goldman and Sripada, 2005,
p. 206). Since people with MS have lived with their condition
22Note, however, that this response entails abandonment of the facial feedback
hypothesis, which is committed to the claim that it is feedback from the facial
musculature that informs face-based emotion recognition.
23As one reviewer suggested, a thorough comparison of aplasic subjects with
individuals with MS could prove very fruitful—in particular with respect to
the effects of compensatory behaviors that they adopt.
their entire lives, it is possible that with time and experience
they have developed other means to achieve social understanding.
Moreover, it is also reasonable to assume that people with congen-
ital conditions such as MS are better adapted to their condition
compared to those with an acquired disability (Smart, 2008).
For these reasons, it would indeed be hasty to draw far-reaching
conclusions about the role of mimicry in face-based emotion
recognition among individuals without MS.
We acknowledge the persuasive force of this response and
indeed think that it points in an important direction. If, as MI
claims, social cognition is a diverse collection of strategies and
practices, it is likely that alternative strategies are available for
those with MS that compensate for their lack of facial mimicry.
Indeed, there is evidence that individuals do indeed avail them-
selves of such alternative strategies and, even more importantly,
that the use of such strategies is correlated with self-esteem, com-
fort in social interactions, and overall well-being. In the following
section, we look more carefully at these strategies.
For now, we only want to note that although these findings
do not justify any definitive conclusions about the reverse sim-
ulation model or about the facial feedback hypothesis, they do
put pressure on SI. This is because individuals with MS lack a
crucial component needed for interaction: facial coupling. With
their absence of facial mobility, they lack what SI considers to
be either an essential enabling condition or a constitutive con-
dition for social understanding (understood, as SI would have
it, as behavioral coupling). For not only do they lack expression
now; crucially, they’ve never had it and thus have always lacked
this critical enabling condition. From the perspective of SI, then,
this inability to interact with others at the level of facial coupling
should also impair their ability to understand facial expressions
of emotions. As one proponent of SI puts it in a recent paper:
“[W]e may experience another’s feelings and intentions directly,
but direct perception builds on something, namely on skillful
interaction with others. In other words, social interaction is [. . . ]
constitutive of the process of social understanding and also of
direct social perception” (de Jaegher, 2009, p. 538). Yet at least
when it comes to emotions, people with MS can, as we’ve seen,
both detect and respond to another’s expressions. In short, they
realize social understanding in the absence of this central coupling
component. However, this is not the only reason to think that MS
challenges the predictions of SI.We consider some further reasons
now and discuss how they appear to lend credence to MI.
COMPENSATORY STRATEGIES
Since they lack the ability to enact facial mimicry, a central form
of behavioral coupling, people with MS employ various compen-
satory strategies to navigate their social world. To help further
evaluate SI and MI, we distinguish two kinds of compensatory
strategies: de-coupled and coupled. We argue that both strategies
put pressure on SI, although for different reasons. De-coupled
strategies do so because they compensate for the disruption of
facial coupling by utilizing explicitly cognitive strategies that
are not inherently interactive—at least in the sense SI requires.
Coupled strategies, in contrast, initiate alternative forms of inter-
active coupling. This is not in itself a problem for SI. Rather, the
problem is that these alternative strategies are deliberately and
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explicitly adopted, and thereby demonstrate the importance of
individual cognitive processes and capacities (top-down control,
deliberate reasoning, conscious observation, and integration of
contextual information, etc.) in enabling coupling. We examine
these two strategies in turn.
DE-COUPLED STRATEGIES
People with MS report that a very common—perhaps central—
strategy they employ to get along socially is an individualistic
cognitive strategy: explicit mentalizing. They often report con-
sciously scrutinizing another’s face or actions, reflecting on the
data present therein, and adopting an observational or spectato-
rial perspective to sort out what it is others are up to. They may
even adopt an explicit mentalizing perspective when monitoring
their own expressions.
For example, children with MS tend to be avid readers. Many
report learning about emotions and sociality from studying the
narratives of characters in books (Cole and Spalding, 2009).
Another man describes the process of falling in love with his wife
this way: “I was initially thinking I was in love with her. It was
some time later when I realized that I really felt in love” (Quoted
in Cole and Spalding, 2009, p. 70). This mentalizing strategy—
along with other explicit strategies like rote learning of gestures
by watching others or deliberate verbal disclosure of emotions—
suggests that people with MS often rely upon explicit cognitive
strategies to compensate for their lack of facial expressiveness
(Bogart et al., 2012).
This mentalizing strategy signals trouble for SI. The non-
interactive character of this spectatorial stance is offered by
defenders of SI as a reason to question false belief tests as
the benchmark of social cognitive competence. SI proponents
claim that these tests put children in the un-natural position
of being passive onlookers, not on-line interactants (Gallagher,
2001, p. 99; Hutto, 2004, p. 549; Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 54). Since only
children of roughly 4.5 years or more can pass explicit verbal false
belief tests, 24 this explicitly mentalistic orientation, SI defenders
claim, overlooks the repertoire of embodied capacities in place
at birth which appears to support rudimentary, non-mentalistic
forms of social understanding operative long before we are able to
pass false belief tests. More simply, the passive theorizing required
by false belief tests is not a kind of genuine interaction, accord-
ing to the SI proponent; or minimally, it requires the presence
of a more fundamental form of embodied interaction that pro-
ceeds independently of explicit mentalizing. The latter is thus a
derivative form of non-interactive social understanding.
However, in people withMSwho lack a crucial embodied com-
ponent, explicit mentalizing sometimes comes to the forefront as
a compensatory non-interactive (i.e., de-coupled) strategy yield-
ing effective social understanding. So, it simply cannot be that
interaction—which, according to SI, is distinct from spectatorial
mentalizing strategies—is constitutive [i.e., a necessary “here and
now” component (de Jaegher et al., 2010)] of social understand-
ing. In response, the SI proponent can argue that this explicit
mentalizing is itself a kind of interaction. However, this move
both (1) appears inconsistent with SI’s critique of the mentalistic
24See Doherty, 2009 for a review of these studies.
orientation of the false belief test (as well as its critique of the
Theory of Mind paradigm more generally), and (2) risks stretch-
ing the definition of “interaction” so thinly that it becomes
unclear what is genuinely distinctive about SI.
COUPLED STRATEGIES
Not all strategies are explicitly mentalistic. Some of the strategies
employed by people with MS involve compensatory expressive
gestures. For example, individuals with MS report using eye
contact to display confidence and exaggerated prosody, body lan-
guage, and verbal disclosure to express emotion (Meyerson, 2001;
Bogart and Matsumoto, 2010a, p. 136). Gestures may become
exaggerated to replace facial animation; prosody and posture can
likewise be recruited, as can spatial proximity to others (Krueger,
2011). As one man with MS writes, “The tone, the volume, the
timbre of the voice, and bodily language, I use to supplement in
ways that my face can’t provide . . . I have a whole repertoire of
laughs that I use to respond to different situations” (Bogart et al.,
2012). A recent study appears to confirm that people with con-
genital facial paralysis employ increased compensatory expressive
behavior (Bogart et al., 2012; see also Chaimov et al., 2011).
An intriguing consequence is that the adoption of com-
pensatory expressive gestures may initiate alternative forms of
behavioral coupling. Since social interaction is both reciprocal
and synchronous (i.e., it includes behavioral matching), it is
likely that these compensatory strategies are mirrored in inter-
action partners, giving people with MS access to non-face-based
informational channels (voice, posture, gesture, spatial proximity,
etc.) from which they can glean information about their part-
ner’s emotional status. In short, the recruitment of compensatory
expressive strategies may cause new signals to emerge on both
sides of the interactive dyad that take the place of face-based cues.
Although there is no direct evidence to support this proposal at
the moment, we submit that the extensive body of research on
mimicry and synchronization canvassed above provides sufficient
indirect support to lend it a high degree of plausibility. At any rate,
the proposal points out an intriguing direction to be investigated
by future research.
The behavioral strategies presented in this section, in con-
trast to explicit mentalizing, present alternative ways of sustaining
engagement within interaction. As such, they do not immediately
appear to challenge SI. The important point for our purposes is
that, although they are coupled strategies, they are nevertheless
deliberately and explicitly adopted, and thereby demonstrate the
importance of individual cognitive processes in enabling at least
some forms of interactive coupling. For example, one 40-year-
old-woman with MS writes: “All my gesture is voluntary, even
now aged 46. Everything I do, I think about . . . All the things I
am doing, whether turning my head or moving my hands, is all
self-taught. I learnt from observation as a child” (Quoted in Cole
and Spalding, 2009, p. 190). Another woman describes learning
to bodily express emotions by deliberately watching locals whilst
on holiday in Spain and then intentionally adopting their gestu-
ral patterns upon her return to the UK (Cole and Spalding, 2009,
pp. 154–155).
Again, our claim is not that SI excludes the possibility that
explicit compensatory strategies may initiate alternative forms of
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coupling. Rather, the problem for SI, as we see it, is that it does not
predict that this would occur. And this is no accident. Insofar as SI
regards coupling processes as alternatives to individual cognitive
processes (which, once again, for SI may marginalize individual
cognition or even render it superfluous), it is conceptualized in
a way that is in tension with integrative proposals—such as the
version of MI we are defending—acknowledging that both cou-
pled and de-coupled strategies can co-exist and work together in
helping us navigate the complexities of our social world.
GENERALIZING THE FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDY
In the previous section, we argued that compensatory cou-
pled strategies (increased eye contact, exaggerated gestures and
prosody, etc.) are often explicitly and deliberately adopted by
people with MS, and that they are, therefore, dependent upon
integration with higher-level individual cognitive processes. We
also suggested that this is no anomaly. Rather, it exemplifies MI’s
more general conception of fine-grained coordination of higher-
level individual cognition and behavioral coupling. To motivate
this latter claim about the generalizability of the findings dis-
cussed here, let us close with a brief sidelong glance toward the
broader research context in which we would like to embed this
case study.
There is ample evidence of top-down effects upon relatively
automatic, unconscious bodily processes in social interaction. It
has been shown, for example, that empathetic pain responses,
as measured by activation in ACC, are modulated by numerous
contextual factors such as whether or not one believes the per-
son experiencing the pain deserves it (de Vignemont and Singer,
2006). It has also been shown that sub-threshold behavioral
mimicry, as assessed by co-representation tasks, is modulated by
perspective-taking (Müller et al., 2011).
Additionally, consider research concerning the situation-
dependence of mimicry. Several studies have found that mimicry
is modulated by prior attitudes of the observer or by group
membership. For example, individuals observed watching video
excerpts of politicians were more likely to facially mimic if they
shared the politician’s views than if they did not (McHugo et al.,
1991; Bourgeois and Hess, 2008). Interactants were also found to
preferentially mimic certain facial displays depending upon the
social context (Hess and Bourgeois, 2010). Finally, it has been
show that we are more likely to imitate people with high status—
an efficacious strategy given that imitation tends to increase
rapport (Cheng and Chartrand, 2003).
There are also reasons to think that mimicry is not only mod-
ulated but sometimes actively suppressed by top-down control
(Brass et al., 2005). Again, mimicry increases rapport. However,
there are surely occasions where rapport gets in the way of per-
forming a task—it may, for example, prevent one from suspecting
others of lying or cheating, and thus detract from one’s perfor-
mance when the task is to detect liars or cheaters (cf. Stel et al.,
2009). And there is some empirical support for the notion that
people indeed suppress mimicry in a way that is sensitive to such
considerations. Lanzetta and Englis (1989) found mimicry in a
cooperative context (e.g., teammates in a game) but counter-
mimicry in a competitive context (e.g., opponents in a game) (see
also Hess, 1998).
These results suggest that mimicry is not as automatic and
reflex-like as is generally assumed. Rather, it is embedded in
broader networks of social information that comes from vari-
ous channels: information given not just by another’s face but by
their body (posture, gesture), voice (prosody, language, etc.), and
spatial proximity, as well as background information about their
personality, goals and interests. We have been arguing that this is
typical for the bodily and interactive processes that are recruited
in social interaction, and that our case study provides additional
supporting evidence for this general view.
Another intriguing possibility, which we hope can be explored
in future research, is to consider whether some of the patterns we
have observed and some of the strategies we have documented
may be valid for various other disorders besides MS. One obvious
comparison would be to individuals with facial impoverishment
due to Parkinson’s disease. Do these individuals also employ
some of the same kinds of compensatory strategies as individual
with MS? If so, what effects does that have upon coupling pro-
cesses within social interactions? What differences does it make
that their condition is an acquired rather than a congenital one?
Another potentially interesting comparison would be to investi-
gate individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), some of
whom likely employ de-coupled strategies to compensate for their
difficulties in social interactions. Indeed, it has been suggested
that autists are unable to depend upon intuitive, flexible pro-
cesses (e.g., implicit mentalizing, implicit understanding of social
codes and conventions) that characterize much of everyday social
cognition in normal, healthy subjects, and that they often favor
deliberate rule-based reasoning (perhaps a kind of highly “theory-
driven” mentalizing) as an alternative strategy (Hermelin and
O’Connor, 1985; Bowler, 1992; Sacks, 1995; Zahavi and Parnas,
2003; Hobson et al., 2006; Williams and Happé, 2010; Lehnhardt
et al., 2011). This proposal draws support from studies that have
found evidence that performance on emotion recognition tasks
is uniquely supported by verbal intelligence among individu-
als with autism (e.g., Grossman et al., 2000). Intriguingly, some
researchers have even reported that individuals with ASD are
more likely than control subjects to imitate observed facial expres-
sions when asked to categorize them, suggesting that they may
employ an explicit simulation routine as a compensatory strat-
egy (Gepner et al., 2001; Wright, 2008). It is also interesting in
this context to note that, although individuals with ASD are less
likely to spontaneously gaze-follow (Klin et al., 2002) and scan
faces (Osterling et al., 2002), they can do so if explicitly instructed
and indeed improve at social cognition tasks as a result (Weeks
and Hobson, 1992).
And yet, although compensatory strategies may enable autists
to perform well on some experimental tasks, this is in con-
trast to the manifest difficulties that autists typically have in
their social lives (Hobson et al., 2006; Williams and Happé,
2010). Unfortunately, such strategies may not apply well to real
online social situations which typically require quick, flexible, and
context-sensitive reasoning, and where deliberate de-coupled rea-
soning can disrupt the flow of interaction, and disrupt autists’
online self-monitoring as well. For individuals with MS, how-
ever, the situation may be importantly different since there is no
reason to expect them to have difficulties detecting or responding
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to social contingency or with quick, flexible and context-sensitive
reasoning. As a result, although they lack one important but
replaceable enabler of behavioral coupling, they may well have no
problems with coupling per se, whereas individuals with ASDmay
(cf. Timmermans et al., in press). Thus, we would conjecture that
the compensatory strategies employed by individuals withMS are
more likely than those employed by individuals with ASD to lead
to alternative forms of coupling.
CONCLUSIONS: THE PLURAL PRACTICE OF SOCIAL
COGNITION
We have argued that SI appears to both make too strong a claim
and adopt too narrow a focus when it comes to thinking about
how we realize social understanding. Perhaps the most substan-
tive lesson from MS cases, we suggest, is that they affirm the
idea that social cognition is a heterogeneous group of processes,
strategies, and practices that collectively enable us to negotiate
the social world. We earlier christened this ecumenical approach
MI. Again, the core of MI is the idea that interaction may offer
resources and afford access to information that can complement,
if not necessarily replace, the resources and information avail-
able to individual processes. In other words, MI maintains that
the bodily processes that enable coupling in social interactions
can—along with information-processing in the brain—jointly
constitute cognition and emotion. Contra SI, it thus denies that
coupling itself is the exclusive locus of social understanding.
Rather, coupling functions alongside and indeed often together
with various individualistic processes and strategies.
Apart from providing a better interpretation of existing facts
bearing upon the relationship between coupling and higher-level,
more conscious and deliberate control, we think that MI also
offers a promising platform for future research—particularly with
respect to MS but also in social cognition research more gen-
erally. For example, as we have pointed out, MI generates the
hypothesis that the compensatory strategies adopted by indi-
viduals with MS may spread to their interaction partners and
thereby open up alternative informational channels (voice, pos-
ture, gesture, spatial proximity, etc.) within which coupling may
occur. However, insofar as the need to learn how to compen-
sate in these alternative ways may be a challenge for individuals
with MS, it may cause subsequent delays in the development
of social skills or cognition more generally. This is an empiri-
cal question worth investigating further (see Cole and Spalding,
2009, pp. 180–185). It could, therefore, be fruitful for future
research on MS to investigate the development of gesturing and
gestural coupling in MS from a developmental perspective, and
to look for correlations with the development of other social-
cognitive processes. Moreover, MI also raises novel questions
about disruptions of coupling as such and corresponding com-
pensatory strategies more generally. Thus, future research may
investigate whether the patterns we have observed and some of
the strategies we have documented may be generalizable to other
conditions such as Parkinson’s Disease or ASD—and in partic-
ular, whether there are any similarities or important differences
between the disruptions of coupling in MS, Parkinson’s, and
ASD, or between the different strategies employed to compensate
for them.
In addition to potentially offering a platform for future
research, MI also seems to accord with the phenomenology of
everyday social experience. Surely those of us without MS also
avail ourselves of diverse resources and shift fluidly among strate-
gies in our social interactions. Sometimes, as when I encounter
a stranger behaving oddly, I may adopt a more theoretical per-
spective and summon bits of folk psychology to sort out what
it is I think he’s up to. Or I might imaginatively project myself
into his mental shoes and try and figure out how I might feel
and act in that situation. At other times, direct perception may
provide sufficient information about another’s intentions and
emotions without my having to summon theories or simulations.
In short, the conception of gestural coupling as one tool among
many others in the mature agent’s social toolkit is supported by
evidence from a broader research context and fits well with the
phenomenology of everyday social life.
In sum, close consideration of the case of MS demonstrates the
need for muchmore fine-grained hypotheses concerning the rela-
tionship between behavioral coupling and higher-level individual
cognition than have heretofore been articulated. Additionally, it
helps illustrate the explanatory merits of an integrative approach,
such as MI, which takes its starting point from the heterogeneous
character of social cognition and social interaction.
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